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Abstract 
The present study investigates the following problem: What are the regulatory 
structures of land based transportation in the greater Copenhagen area? In order 
to obtain a comprehensive understanding of this problem, three sub questions 
were designed to target the structures in detail. These are: How do European 
regulations on the area of the land based transportation influence the subsidy 
process within the Danish market? How does the quality measurement system 
meet the challenges of a changing market within subsidies? And where is the 
customer focus in the Danish market? 
Such research was developed under the scope of legal pluralism, through a 
literature review on the EU regulatory process, the Danish market and subsidies, 
and with passenger surveys and key individual interviews. This research has 
identified the regulatory structure on the area, how the EU regulations set the 
framework for national subsidy process, and how the quality measurement system 
is having a more significant role in that process. This research also identified the 
customers from all actors on the Danish market, where the passengers are a direct 
product of the customer interest. 
The study consists of 20.572 words without literature. 
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EU subsidies in public transportation:  
The Copenhagen case 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
European regulations have long been a part of the governmental and regulatory 
process of the member states, ever since the mid-nineties, but the public 
transportation in the greater Copenhagen area was already introduced to subsidies 
in 1989, with operational start in 1990 on nine services, as part of the privatization 
of all buses within HT (Hovedstadsområdets Trafikselskab red.). 
The first material for the bidding process in 1989 consisted of fifty-five pages, 
where half of it was schedules and only little was mentioned about the quality of 
delivered service. Within the next twelve years, all services in the greater 
Copenhagen area were successfully subsided from the public owned HT, who 
now entered the role as a traffic authority and not an operator. 
Many of the private operators throughout the bidding process have been public 
owned companies, such as the railways from Denmark, Sweden, Norway, 
Germany and France. The last two are still performing the majority of the service 
in the greater Copenhagen area in 2017. 
Since the early nineties many services have been changed, diverted or cancelled - 
and the structure on public transportation was greatly modified in 2007, when the 
counties were replaced by regions. From 2007, it was no longer HT who was the 
sole planner, but the municipalities and regions as well, and therefore many 
services were changed due to the will of some municipalities, who saw them as an 
unnecessary expense and an easy way to cut in the budget. 
The EU legislation on subsidies has also changed. Where it used to mostly focus 
on the lowest price, more parameters like carbon footprint, level of delivered 
quality and percentage of delivered service, it is now starting to play a more 
significant role alongside the lowest price. Some might argue that the larger 
companies are starting to have a greater advantage, since all law can be 
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interpreted for their own benefit. In the latest bidding process from 2016, the 
material consisted of two hundred and three pages, where only thirty-six pages are 
about the schedules. The rest of the material consisted of the qualification process 
and the expectations of the delivered quality in service, including IT, CSR and 
environmental footprint.
1
 
In recent years, the operators have closed in on the price and are now competing 
more on the delivered quality of service, where many operators are putting in a 
bid with a very high level of service. At the same time, Movia (Traffic authority 
in the greater Copenhagen area red.) has recently lowered the expectations for 
“very satisfied customers” in the traffic plan of 2016. 
The regulatory process is very extensive as it is regulated by the EU for the 
member states, where these are to perform within the regulations. It is therefore 
the member state government or governmental institutions that have the 
responsibility for the regulations to be complied with. The regulations are binding, 
but leave space in order for national governments and local traffic authorities to 
find their way of performing subsidies, as long as they are in compliance with the 
basic regulatory rules. 
The traffic authority in Copenhagen is one of these actors, who is performing 
subsidies on behalf of the national government within the regulatory rules. On the 
Danish market, the traffic authorities in the greater Copenhagen area have always 
been standard setting actors, and it is thus relevant to examine the Copenhagen 
case within the Danish market. 
One of the main measurement systems within subsidies in the greater Copenhagen 
area is the quality measurement system, which has lately been one of the 
parameters where operators are increasingly competing. Therefore, it is interesting 
to examine if the system is in compliance with the European regulations, what 
difference the system makes for the subsidy process and how they connect. 
                                                          
1 Trafikselskabet Movia, Prisudvikling (køreplantimer) siden 2008. Alle priser i oktober 2015 prisniveau. A5, A6, A8, A9, 
A10, A11, A12, A13 og A14, 2016, Trafikselskabet Movia, Copenhagen 
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The central Copenhagen and suburban area are served by the A-bus system, which 
consists of eight high frequency lines with a significant amount of users. This 
system is highly linked to the quality measurement system, which is used to 
measure the performance of the operators within subsidies. This research will 
therefore focus on the A-bus system, in connection with the quality measurement 
system. 
Finally, the researcher finds it relevant to examine the various customer focuses 
on the Danish market, in order to analyze the inter-governmental models for 
subsidies within the greater Copenhagen area. 
This research provides an analysis of subsidies and the quality measurement 
system in the greater Copenhagen area, and how these relate with each other. This 
is obtained through a literature review of European regulations on the land based 
transportation area, the Danish market, the subsidy process in the greater 
Copenhagen area and the quality measurement system, followed by surveys with 
passengers and interviews with key individuals in the Danish market. 
Thus, the author is exploring the following problem: What are the regulatory 
structures of land based transportation in the greater Copenhagen area? In order 
to obtain a comprehensive understanding of this problem, three sub questions 
were designed to target the structures in detail. These are: How do European 
regulations on the area of the land based transportation influence the subsidy 
process within the Danish market? How does the quality measurement system 
meet the challenges of a changing market within subsidies? And where is the 
customer focus in the Danish market? 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
Chapter 2: Literature review 
2.1. European governance on the area of transport policy 
Governance and policy making in the EU can be a very delicate and long 
processed matter, especially when it comes to a common policy on land based 
transport. The latest policy on European land based transport is from 2007, which 
will be described later in this chapter. 
Kerwer and Teutsch mention that the Luxembourg compromise from 1966 was 
the first time the European transport policy was to be discussed, and at that time 
countries like Germany, France and Italy did not have any interest in opening their 
markets. The member states were opposed to the liberalization of services, so the 
liberalization did not occur before somewhat in the late 1980s.
2
 
According to Sweet and Sandholtz, the theory of European member state 
integration is that supranational governance will make binding policies throughout 
the European Community, and that the function of the Rome treaty was to reason 
on a common market across national borders.
3
 But Kerwer and Teutsch state that 
the European policy making on the transport area has not been the success it was 
suppose to be, and was difficult to get started in the late 1960s. 
It gained momentum in the 80s, but has again lost momentum since.
4
 The wish for 
common European politics on the area has not been reachable and the transport 
policy is still dealt with by the national states, although with a mutual agreement 
among the member states. 
Supranational and intergovernmental elements are, according to Kerwer and 
Teutsch, fundamental characteristics of the cooperation between the EU member 
states – and can give some explanation to why it has been very difficult to 
                                                          
2 Kerwer, Dieter and Teutsch, Michael, The European Union impact on national Policymaking pp. 26-27, 2001, Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, Cumnor Hill 
3 Sandholtz, Wayne and Sweet, Alec Stone, European integration and supranational governance pp. 8-9, 1998, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 
4
 Kerwer et al. 2001 pp. 24-25 
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integrate a common European transport policy.
5
 Kohler-Koch describes that the 
single market has transformed Europe into a political unit on sector basis. The 
political units develop various intra-system negotiations, where the member states 
can no longer claim monopoly on representing the sole interest of their citizens.
6
 
The difference between intergovernmental politics and supranational politics are, 
according to Sweet and Sandholtz, that the governance on EU level is operated by 
a functional international organization by the member states, whereas 
intergovernmental governance is bargaining between two member states.
7
 
Previously, the transport area has been dominated with major state intervention 
and therefore, some of the key issues were in changing the mindset in the process 
of liberalizing the market and the decision making on the road transport area. 
According to Kerwer and Teutsch, it has always been a battle between opening 
the market and harmonizing the competitive conditions, especially when 
multinational companies were to enter these markets.
8
 
Smith argues that some of the European regulation policies have been more 
intergovernmental than supranational, hence the different levels of involvement or 
the amount of national law on the area e.g. on the land based transport area, where 
it took almost twenty-five years to agree on the first proposal and then twenty 
more to the second.
9
 
Kerwer and Teutsch argue that the EU made several strategic mistakes by trying 
to introduce a fully developed European establishment at first, when formulating a 
concept for the substitution of national politics.
10
 
The proposal was overambitious and complicated for the member states to agree. 
Additionally, the authors state that the fully developed European approach 
                                                          
5
 Kerwer et al. 2001 pp. 26-27 
6
 Kohler-Koch, Beate, The evolution and transformation of European Governance pp. 19, 1999, Routledge 
7
 Sandholtz et al. 1998 pp. 9-10 
8
 Kerwer  et al. 2001 pp. 26 + 31 
9 Smith, Michael E., Rules, Transgovernmentalism, and the Expansion of the European Political Cooperation (part of 
European integration and supranational governance) pp. 307, 1998, Oxford Press, Oxford 
10
 Kerwer  et al. 2001 pp.27 
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switched to a more pragmatic one in the 1970s, where the focus was now on 
finding solutions in more specific areas, which led to member states continually 
liberalizing their markets, when other member states did not.
11
 
This explains the momentum in the late 1980s, where the EU came to an 
agreement on a regulation for a common European transport policy on land based 
transport, effective from 1993, making the European market liberalized and open. 
However, the harmonization process did not follow. Technical and social 
regulation had to be abandoned in order to agree on a common politics.
12
 
The essence of successful governance in European policies is, according to 
Kohler-Koch, to reach binding decisions. The timeframe is not always the most 
important factor.
13
 And the European member states finally did agree on a larger 
liberalization. 
From the view of Kerwer and Teutsch, the most difficult subject to agree on was 
the fiscal politics, but the member states managed to agree on minimum taxation 
of fuel and vehicle taxes. Nevertheless, all member states had already before or 
shortly after changed their taxation system above the minimum taxation limit 
agreed.
14
 
However, Smith argues that domestic interest is very absent in policy making and 
the member states are less willing to expand their authority on this matter.
15
 But 
this does not seem to be the case for the particular matter of the European 
transport policy. National interest has several times prolonged an agreement. 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 Kerwer  et al. 2001 pp. 27-28 
12
 Kerwer  et al. 2001 pp. 30 
13
 Kohler-Koch, Beate, The evolution and transformation of European Governance pp. 14, 1999, Routledge 
14
 Kerwer  et al. 2001 pp.30 
15
 Smith et al. 1998 pp. 331 
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2.2. EU regulation EC/1370/2007 
Smith states that since the Maastricht tractate it is remarkable that when it comes 
to European policies, the member states are increasingly feeling obligated to adapt 
to common policies.
16
 
It seems that the European member states have been able to find a common 
transportation policy, to which they can all agree, but the policy is very short and 
it does not include much regulation, besides some common rules of transparency 
and length of contracts.
17
 It does not contain much about harmonization, but does 
have a strong sense of liberalization in it. 
The EU regulation 1370/2007 does not state many demands to the member states 
in how to award tenders; but the most important passage is number thirty; directly 
awarded public service contracts should be subject to greater transparency.
18
 
Kerwer and Teutsch state that the European road transport market is widely 
subject to EU legislation in present time; while it has been on its way since the 
Rome treaty; it was fully implemented in the mid 1990s. The European road 
transport market is now very market-oriented as wished by the EU.
19
 
The liberalization process has been a success, but the harmonization process is 
limited and most attempts have been unsuccessful. Kohler-Koch argues that the 
EU policy making process has later changed with more actors, where now regions 
and municipalities are represented along with national states, and that European 
governance is not an embracing pattern which is stable, but varies across policy 
areas and over time.
20
 
                                                          
16
 Smith et al. 1998 pp. 330 
17
 European Union, Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on 
public passenger transport services by rail and by road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No. 1191/69 
and 1107/70 pp. 6-11, 2007, Bruxelles 
18 European Union et al. 2007 pp. 4 
19
 Kerwer  et al. 2001 pp.30-31 
20 Kohler-Koch et al. 1999 pp. 32 
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According to Van de Velde, the most important factor in the new regulation from 
2007 is that there is now a possibility for the authority to run a public private 
partnership with an operator, where the authority is not completely in charge of 
service, but less dominant.
21
 
It is still allowed to directly award a contract, if the annual pay is less than one 
million euro or 300.000 driven kilometers. However, the member state can by 
national law regulate against this practice.
22
 But Van de Velde finds that the key 
in this European policy is that the authority has to publish an annual report on 
public service obligations, where they have to state on their compensation 
payments and exclusive granted rights. 
The report should also contain record of performance, quality and network 
financing. All financing and quality within the network should be assessed.
23
 
2.3. Policies on the Danish bus market 
The Danish transport market has a long story of liberalization when it comes to 
road based transport, with more specific public transportation provided by buses. 
The market in Copenhagen was first privatized in the late 1980s and has later 
gone into full liberalization of both Copenhagen and the country through 
regulations. 
Ünay describes regulations as rules issued with the purpose of ensuring that 
private and public operators conduct their operations in a certain manner. 
However, this has lately been described as a sustained and focused control, where 
the public part has a legitimate mandate on the activities, which are often regarded 
as advantageous to society.
24
 
According to Van de Velde, the tendering in Copenhagen started with very simple 
total cost contracts where quality management features where gradually added. 
                                                          
21 Van de Velde, Didier, A new regulation for the European public transport pp. 82, 2008, Elsevier, Delft 
22
 Van de Velde, Didier, A new regulation for the European public transport pp. 82, 2008, Elsevier, Delft 
23
 Van de Velde, Didier, A new regulation for the European public transport pp. 83, 2008, Elsevier, Delft 
24 Ünay, Sadik, The rise of the Regulatory State in Europe pp. 25-27, 2011, Turkish Journal of politics 
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The “Copenhagen way” has been an example to subsidies around Denmark, and 
many of the authorities adapted, in particular, the color scheme of all the buses in 
their region. Only very few authorities let their operators choose their own color 
scheme, which all ended in 2007, where only local school services can operate in 
colors that stands out from the scheme.
25
 
Ünay states that, since the deregulation and liberalization of the markets in the EU 
from the late 1980s, there has been a clear need of separation of regulatory and 
operational responsibilities, meaning that the government would serve as the 
regulatory part and privately owned business would engage in tenders in order to 
provide the operational services.
26
 
He adds that the State had to change from a producer of public goods and services 
to power of regulations, which had to ensure their operators would act properly in 
their economical role.
27
 This is supported by Van de Velde, who states that there 
is a growing involvement of the private sector into the public service production 
through subsidies.
28
 
The involvement of especially British and French companies is one of the 
highlighted statements, where British Arriva group and French Keolis and Connex 
(now merged with Transdev) have been very active around Europe – also in 
Denmark. Furthermore, Connex has been active all around the globe and is 
represented in almost every continent. 
Van de Velde describes how Scottish Stagecoach group withdrew from the 
Scandinavian market rather quickly after starting up, selling their Danish part to 
the Danish railways company at the time: Combus.
29
 This is supported by 
                                                          
25
 Van de Velde, Didier, The evolution of organizational forms in European public transport pp. 3, 2001, Erasmus 
University, Rotterdam 
26
 Ünay et al. 2011 pp. 22-23 
27
 Ünay et al. 2011 pp. 24 
28 Van de Velde, Regulations and competition in the European land transport industry: Some recent evolutions pp. 1, 
2003, Erasmus University, Rotterdam 
29
 Van de Velde, Regulations and competition in the European land transport industry: Some recent evolutions pp. 4, 
2003, Erasmus University, Rotterdam 
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DeLaine, who claims in his article that the Danish liberalized market has killed 
many operators.
30
 
Van de Velde describes how almost two thirds of the Danish market for bus 
transport in 2003 was controlled by British Arriva group and French Connex 
group. The price for delivered service is still well under 10% of the prices prior to 
subsidies and according to the same author, the quality of performance has 
increased.
31
 
In 2003 there were many smaller Danish operators, but since 2003 these have 
increased in size, and companies like Herning Turist in Herning, De Blaa Busser 
in Skive, Dito Bus in Holbæk, De Blaa Omnibusser in Holte and Anchersen in 
Copenhagen have rapidly increased their share in the market. 
During the HUR (Hovedstadens udviklingsråd red.) period of Copenhagen in the 
early 00s, the local railways and bus services were all put under the same 
umbrella, which has continued after 2007 to Movia, now covering all of Zeeland. 
Also, this process has spread to other traffic authorities around Denmark.
32
 
Van de Velde states that lately, the Danish tenders have been more open to 
incentive contracts, where operators are to make the route(s) more attractive to 
customers.
33
 The Danish market – not only for buses – has been affected through 
the last thirty years by New Public Management, which in accordance with 
Sørensen has resulted in a fragmented policy towards planning and production of 
public transportation.
34
 
Sørensen describes the Danish bus market as a market where the authority 
determines the level of service and quality, and where the operators have to focus 
                                                          
30
 DeLaine, Thomas, Fakta om Combus, 2001, Myldretid, Copenhagen 
31
 Van de Velde, Regulations and competition in the European land transport industry: Some recent evolutions pp. 4, 
2003, Erasmus University, Rotterdam 
32
 Van de Velde, Didier, The evolution of organizational forms in European public transport pp. 3, 2001, Erasmus 
University, Rotterdam 
33
 Van de Velde, Regulations and competition in the European land transport industry: Some recent evolutions pp. 4, 
2003, Erasmus University, Rotterdam 
34
 Sørensen, Claus Hedegaard, Increased coordination in public transport – which mechanisms are available? pp. 117, 
2010, Elsevier, Kongens Lyngby 
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on minimizing the costs. However, in Halland (Sweden) there has been a larger 
success with a joint working group on how to operate the local buses; this has 
resulted in more decisions being based on the need of both parts.
35
 
As of 2003, the traffic authority in Copenhagen introduced tenders based on pre-
qualifications with longer contracts (6+2+2 years).
36
 Sørensen states that with the 
different European markets there has been very little focus on the coordination in 
public transportation, but themes like trusting partnerships are now starting to 
emerge.
37
 
This is also something that Pallavicini has mentioned; stating that the introduced 
service partnerships in public transportation in Copenhagen represent progress, 
although the legal situation in the contracts undermines the trust relationship 
between the partners.
38
 
Furthermore, the author states that in order to obtain a fully trusted partnership 
between the authority and the operator, there has to be a fully operational 
partnership, where the traffic authority should let go more of the paternalistic role 
and give more responsibility to the operator.
39
 
Sørensen has an example to this kind of partnership, where Merseyrail in the 
United Kingdom got the full responsibility over both rail and trains, as operator.
40
 
Furthermore, he mentions the joint spirit of Rail Net Denmark and the Danish 
State Railways, where there is common understanding of the problems, and where 
the solutions are found in a close collaboration.
41
 
Partnerships, understood as an equal partnership between two parts where there is 
no penalty if the obligations are not met, is not common within the bus industry in 
                                                          
35
 Sørensen et al. 2010 pp. 121 
36
 Van de Velde, Regulations and competition in the European land transport industry: Some recent evolutions pp. 4, 
2003, Erasmus University, Rotterdam 
37
 Sørensen et al. 2010 pp. 118 
38 Pallavicini, Jef, Public-private partnerships in public transportation pp. 15, 2015, Metropol, Copenhagen 
39
 Pallavicini et al. 2015 pp. 19 
40
 Sørensen et al. 2010 pp. 120 
41
 Sørensen et al. 2010 pp. 121 
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Scandinavia, but has been introduced to more than 380 contracts European wide. 
These partnerships tend to focus on delivering solutions, rather than penalize.
42
 
2.4. Comparing with German transport policies 
Since the Danish market according to Van de Velde is exclusive compared to 
other European markets functioning under the EU regulation on the land based 
transportation area, it is worth investigating a neighboring market which functions 
under the same regulation. 
According to Buehler and Pucher, sustainability is very important to authorities 
around Europe, but many of them tend to forget the financial sustainability, 
because the environmental part is dominant. This results in many markets of low 
productivity and high cost, and therefore there is a larger need for governmental 
support.
43
 
The importance in public transport is, as report by Buehler and Pucher, to reduce 
costs and increase productivity, especially because mass public transportation 
offers benefits to city traffic solutions and the environment.
44
 The authors 
examined the German system, where the user share increased by twenty-two 
percent from 1992 to 2007, and the operating cost has decreased where as of 2007 
it was covered seventy-seven percent by passenger fares.
45
 
The reason for the success with public transportation in Germany is, according to 
Buehler and Pucher, that Germany adapted tenders in the early 1990s, where there 
was a large focus on the operating cost, especially on benefits not required by law. 
Many companies were overpaying their personal on overtime and odd hours, for 
example. 
But the reason for the cut in operating costs can also be found in Berlin, where the 
local union negotiated a forty-two hour workweek, which is more than 
                                                          
42
 Sørensen et al. 2010 pp. 122 
43
 Buehler, Ralph and Pucher, John, Making public transport financially sustainable pp. 3, 2011, Transport Policy 
44
 Buehler et al. 2011 pp. 3 
45
 Buehler et al. 2011 pp. 4 
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comparable markets, such as the Danish with its thirty-seven hours per week.
46
 
The success in cutting the operating costs was also dominated in the 1990s, prior 
to the tenders, by the local authority and public owned bus companies to freeze 
the salaries, often for up to five years, even though they promised not to lay off 
any of the workers.
47
 
Buehler and Pucher describe how often older drivers were encouraged to retire 
early and new younger drivers were hired on a lower salary. From 1997 to 2007, 
the amount of workers in the authorities has decreased by twenty-five percent, 
where the payroll cost has decreased from forty-eight percent to thirty-eight 
percent. 
In Berlin, only eleven-thousand workers were in service by 2008, where it used to 
be twenty-eight-thousand in 1991.
48
 Another way to cut the operating cost for the 
authority and municipalities can be found in Hamburg, where a bus line similar to 
a metro service moves around fifty-thousand passengers per day. The authors 
explain how this previously would have justified building an expensive metro 
line. 
The success in Berlin is also due to a sufficient analysis of the traffic corridors, 
where there has been an increased focus on increasing corridors with many riders 
and decreasing corridors with fewer riders. This “metrobus” system is copied 
around the work, including Denmark, as it has been implemented in Aalborg, 
Århus, Odense and Copenhagen. The conflict of this “metrobus” service is, 
according to Buehler and Pucher, that many car-less households in rural areas are 
often left without any services, as their household is not close to one of the main 
corridors.
49
 
Furthermore, most of the cost reduction in public transportation in Germany has 
been on behalf of the workers, which has resulted in a bigger turnaround in 
                                                          
46
 Buehler et al. 2011 pp. 12 
47
 Buehler et al. 2011 pp. 13 
48
 Buehler et al. 2011 pp. 14 
49
 Buehler et al. 2011 pp. 19 
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employers throughout the German bus companies and a lower work moral. It is 
estimated that the salary in some cases is even too low to maintain a standard of 
living in many Metropolitan areas. 
This has resulted in increased conflicts between unions and employers – and has 
led to many strikes within bus, train and even flight services around Germany.
50
 
One example of increasing the operational cost too much is the Berlin based S-
bahn, where many of the workshops have been closed and the employees do not 
have enough time to inspect the cars in order, which almost resulted in an accident 
in 2009. 
According to Buehler and Pucher, the lesson learned from Germany is to improve 
the quality of service having the customer in mind, with attractive priced monthly 
or annual tickets, and transit integrated services between the various regional 
transport modes. Internet based information with regular traffic information is 
also an increased factor.
51
 
2.5. Breaking monopoly? 
According to Van de Velde, it is only Denmark, Sweden and The Netherlands 
who have adopted the full model of subsidies, where countries like Germany, 
Austria, Spain, among others often have direct awards.
52
 The author states that the 
market in Copenhagen and Denmark tends to be of increasing oligopoly, where 
for example Combus, the former State railway bus company came into deep 
financial trouble cornering the market with constantly underbidding, since the mid 
90s. The company is now taken over by the British group Arriva.
53
 
According to Héritier, the implementation of liberalization on the water, energy, 
communication and transport areas had the purpose of improving competition, 
productivity and creating more consumer choice. However, the author adds that 
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after the liberalization of the market, there have been increasing concerns on the 
maintenance of the general interest goals in service provision, such as equality, 
continuity and services which are affordable.
54
 
This raises some questions within the EU, if the liberalization of these markets is 
in sync with market making policies and economic regulations. Héritier questions 
if liberalization and general interest services have conflicting goals regarding 
economy.
55
 
He argues that before the liberalization, most companies in these industries were 
shielded from competition, as they were seen as natural monopolies to provide 
services to the consumers. On the other hand, when the market is liberalized it 
means that the network infrastructure should have one owner i.e. traffic 
authorities, where to increase the efficiency the operations of services could be 
open to competition.
56
 
Ünay argues that the public ownership has been dominant to European politics 
and the response to market failures has often been bureaucratic centralization. 
There has not been a tradition to rely on specialized agencies.
57
 Governments 
have often resisted that public owned companies should be treated as private 
owned companies – also when it comes to monopolies.58 
The thought of this liberalization of operations would therefore ensure greater 
productivity through increased competition between various operators, which 
would lead to more consumer choice and lower prices. Héritier argues that in this 
model, it would promote the general interest through liberalization e.g. on 
accessibility and affordability.
59
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There has also been an increase of free entrepreneurial systems in for example 
Eastern Europe, where especially mini bus services are running privately founded. 
This is also the case outside the EU, in Israel.
60
 However, if the markets were to 
be dominated or made into an oligopoly this would be in direct conflict with the 
general interest and could either ensure higher prices, lower quality or disruption 
of services.
61
 
2.6. The Danish market 
It is clear that there is a wish from the EU to harmonize the market for 
transportation, but it is simply not possible due to the various demands from the 
member states. Nonetheless, an agreement on liberalization on the land based 
transportation area was possible, even though it is not very strong nor full of 
demands; therefore it is up to each member state and each local traffic authority to 
make tenders in their own interpretation of the law. One of these traffic authorities 
is Movia, who currently finished their A15 tender. 
The researcher does not find the framework on the latest EU regulation very 
demanding or setting specific frames for how to run subsidies. It gives a very 
open opportunity to form the subsidies as the authority of local government wants 
it, as long as there is great transparency and the contracts are not awarded longer 
than the period stated in the regulation. It is also the researcher’s view that the 
Danish market is in many areas very transparent, but most material and decisions 
are only available for a very small group and not the greater population. 
2.7. EU subsidies in the greater Copenhagen area 
Within the Danish market the subsidy process first started in the greater 
Copenhagen area in 1989 with the introduction of a law on privatization of forty-
five percent of all services in the greater Copenhagen area by 1994. At the time, 
HT was performing eighty percent of all daily services in the capital area, which 
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at the time consisted of three counties.
62
 From 1994, the HT law was replaced by 
the EU directive EC/94/243.
63
 
In 2017 there have been numerous tenders in the greater Copenhagen area and all 
services have been through the process at least three times, which meant that 
many services has been through various contracts, quality goals and operators. 
The process of subsidies in the greater Copenhagen area has, in many years 
through the 2000s, been characterized by some unrest. Many operators have 
struggled to make profit from delivering service. 
As Van de Velde describes the market has largely been adopted my multi-national 
and international companies,
64
 one of these operators is the former largest 
Swedish operator Linjebus who arrived on the Danish market when it was 
privatized in 1989. Linjebus struggled for over ten years until it was bought by the 
French group Connex (later Veolia), who in 2007 was sold to the British Arriva 
group. 
This scenario also included Scottish operator Stagecoach who struggled to make 
profit on the market and was sold to the former Danish state railway group 
Combus, who were sold in 2001 to the British Arriva group.
65
 
Combus was notoriously known to underbid on contracts all over the country – 
and also in the greater Copenhagen area from 1997. The Danish government paid 
significant financial support to the company, which was later found illegal by the 
EU.
66
 
Throughout the tenders, the focus has always been on the lowest price until 1997, 
where alternative fuel was introduced, and later the level of quality in delivered 
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serviced has found ground. The recent trend is a combination of a low price along 
with a high level of delivered quality. 
All but one privately owned Danish company has managed to survive through the 
subsidy process since 1989, and today there are twelve operators in the greater 
Copenhagen area. Eight of them are Danish based, mostly smaller companies, and 
four are international companies, such as the German based Deutsche Bahn, who 
owns Arriva group, and the French based Keolis group, which together hold the 
largest percentage of services.
67
 
2.8. The quality measurement system 
As mentioned in the introduction, quality in delivered service did not receive 
much attention beyond the basic when the privatization began in 1989, but later a 
system was introduced to measure quality of service in the greater Copenhagen 
area. 
Every year since the quality measurement system was introduced HT, later 
Movia, has been hosting annual awards for best performance within the region. 
The award for most improved service, A-service, S-service and environmental 
operator of the year has also occurred. 
The quality measurement system is based on various customer satisfaction 
indexes and delivered service, which means that all operators compete on the 
same numbers and levels. Not surprisingly, the annual winners have always been 
smaller operators or operators in the outskirts of the region. 
The system has later transformed into a stricter system, where more demands are 
introduced in every tender. The system is very strict on delayed or cancelled 
services. The operators often have very short time to deliver information on these 
occurrences. If a service is cancelled it will result in a lower percentage on the 
delivered service index and increase in payment. 
                                                          
67
 Trafikselskabet Movia, Fordeling af kørsel i Movia fra december 2016, 2016, Trafikselskabet Movia, Copenhagen 
23 
 
The reason for this strict system is partly to be found during a larger period from 
the mid 2000s onwards to the early 2010s, where the quality measurement system 
and contracts were abused by various operators in the greater Copenhagen area.  
Another reason is the development in social media, where internet based customer 
feedback is on the rise and more customers are aware and ready to share any 
experiences on social media the minute any episode occurs. The final reason for 
the strict system is found in the traffic authority, who constantly demands many 
factors in order to streamline the customer experience delivered product. The 
traffic authority is now aiming for a system which is more controlled based, rather 
than trust. 
The delivered service index, also known as the performance index, is based on the 
bid from the operator towards the traffic authority and is basically the delivered 
service in index of one-houndred. Most operators signed contracts to deliver a 
service between ninety-nine point ninety-five and ninety-nine point ninety-eight. 
This is an increase as the norm until the mid 2000s was between ninety point 
ninety-nine and ninety point ninety-two.
 68
 
The customer satisfaction index is based on a thousand point scale and is for the 
operator and traffic authority to agree on how satisfied the customers will be 
based on the contract agreed. Most operators have recently agreed on performing 
between eight-hundred-sixty and eight-hundred-seventy. This goal has only been 
possible to reach on services in the outskirts and on smaller elder services, 
including in the central Copenhagen area. 
To reach eight-hundred-sixty or eight-hundred-seventy on a frequent A service in 
Copenhagen seems very little plausible, but the operators have to set the bar high 
in order to win the tender. The traffic authority has then the right to issue fines 
when the quality level is not reached and release bonuses if the level is reached. 
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One of the main issues to maintain a high focus on keeping the standards is that 
the operators are pressuring the price on the tenders, often close to zero profit, in 
order to win the subsidy; at the same time they are bidding with a high level of 
delivered quality. 
Furthermore, many factors in which the operators have no control over can occur. 
It can be traffic congestions, road works, etc. This will often lead to a lowering in 
customer satisfaction, which cannot be directly pointed back to the operator. 
The quality measurement system is now the main measurement system for 
subsidies within the greater Copenhagen area. 
2.9. The A15 contract 
As discussed, the EU regulations on tenders in the road transportation area did 
only leave a larger frame on how to act according to transparency and length of 
contract, therefore much of the smaller details in tenders is according to the 
authority in which the tender is being held. 
In Copenhagen the authority is Movia, who is responsible for all tenders on buses 
in the capital and Zeeland regions. The latest tender is the A15 from 2016, 
effective from late 2017. The tender is effective on several lines in the regions, but 
the focus of this report is on line 8A in central Copenhagen. 
The A15 tender is based on the EU directive EC/2014/25, which means that the 
tender is awarded after negotiation between the authority and the bidders
69
, and all 
operators need to be prequalified in order to enter the tender. 
The prequalification process is to ensure the liquidation of the operators and that 
all necessary permits are in order, so that the tender cannot be awarded to any 
operator without the correct paperwork, which could lead to a disruption in 
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service.
70
 When entering the first round of the bidding process the bid should 
contain the following:
71
 
 Costs on administration, depot, etc. 
 Costs on vehicles, such as maintenance, cleaning and insurance 
 Costs on drivers, fuel, etc. 
 Costs on facility 
 Quality level and level of delivered service 
 Fuel and information on usage of newer or used buses 
 A list of the type of vehicle expected to be entered on the service (fabric / 
model / length / fuel / euro level) 
 Presentation on how the resources will be used if winning. 
Movia is currently using the criteria of forty percent price, thirty-five percent 
quality in delivered service, ten percent environment and fifteen percent quality of 
material (bus).
72
 
The package no. six containing line 8A is a contract of a one and a half year span, 
with the possibility of another one and a half year containing twenty-two buses in 
regular service with 79.569 annual hours in service.
73
 
2.10. Quality of delivered service 
The quality of delivered service is the criteria after price that is having the highest 
value and is measured by three different values. 
The key value is the quality index, which is being measured on a scale from zero 
to one-thousand. In this particular tender for package six (line 8A), it is only 
possible to leave a bid on the deliver quality index between eight-hundred and 
one-thousand. 
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The traffic authority is performing interviews with customers in order to 
determine the quality index where limitation of noise is the lowest parameter, 
second to lowest is the climate, thereafter the compliance of the time table and 
satisfaction with the driving are equal. Satisfaction of the driver’s service and 
appearance is valued second most, where the most valued parameter is the interior 
condition of the vehicle.
74
 
Another key value is the amount of delivered service, which is measured on a 
scale from zero to one-hundred. In this particular tender, the traffic authority will 
not accept any bids that promises lower than ninety-nine point ninety of delivered 
services. The quality index for delivered service is described in detail later in a 
separate part. The last measurement of quality is how the active traffic control is 
being handled by the operator and the continual communication with the 
authority.
75
 
2.11. Awarding the contract and demands from the authority 
When awarding points to the bidding operators, the authority will award between 
zero and ten points if a bid is valued between nine-hundred and one-thousand on 
the quality index scale, and between zero and ten points on the delivered service if 
the bid is valued between ninety-nine point ninety and one-hundred.
76
 
There is also a scale on awarding the contracts based on the year of the vehicle. 
The scale is again between zero and ten e.g. if the bus is from 2007 or older there 
will be awarded zero points, where as if the vehicle is from 2017 there will be 
given ten points.
77
 Amongst the criteria for vehicles which will enter service, there 
is also an award system for the number of seats in the bus, based on the same 
system from zero to ten. 
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If the bus has less than twenty-nine seats, where twenty-three are front-facing 
there will be awarded zero points. If there are thirty-nine or more seats, where 
thirty-three are front-facing there will be awarded ten points. This point based 
system varies within the different packages.
78
 
There is also different point based systems on various measures like the flex space 
near the doors. One of the more peculiar subjects in the tenders by Movia is that 
all vehicles have to be delivered one month prior to the start date of the awarded 
contract. 
The buses need to be delivered in order for the authority to, among others, install 
IT systems.
79
 But it is clear to see that the bidding process is very streamlined and 
the many demands are designed to more or less make all the buses look similar. 
There are demands from the authority to the operators on the interior design, 
traffic information design, wideness of doors, length of the vehicle, amount of 
doors depending on the various bus types, font and size on numbers on the 
destination information signs and internal/external numbers, distance between 
seats, mute-function on FM radio whenever the front doors are open, kneeling 
function, placement and numbers of handrails, maximum inclination of the floors, 
placement of stop buttons, interior climate, escape hatches, surveillance, mirrors, 
alarm when the vehicle is backing, placement and numbers of trash cans, numbers 
of- and placement of designated holders for newspapers and information folders, 
tidiness of the vehicle, colors of the exterior bus and interior i.e. floors, hand rails, 
seats and rules on limited usage of only designated information on the destination 
signs, which means that only ‘not in service’, ‘extra’ and ‘special service’ is 
allowed. All this comes up to twenty-seven pages – only for the vehicle that is to 
be used in service.
80
 
There are eight pages on demands for environment, twenty-two on IT and ten on 
commercials and infotainment. 
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In the section on demands for operations and traffic management, the authority is 
expecting the winning operator to perform a continuous surveillance of the traffic 
situation on the services. In situations where there is a demand for extra focus i.e. 
marathons, demonstrations, etc., the operator is liable to provide extra staff to 
ensure the best possible operation of their service(s).
81
 
There is a demand for resolute and fast act in the case of normal occurring 
situations like illegal parked vehicles, queuing, road works, weather or delayed 
correspondences. The traffic authority is demanding that the operator finds a fast 
solution to these issues, in order to normalize the operation as fast as possible.
82
 
Movia suggests that the operator should follow instructions from the traffic 
authority information center – and also to find individual solutions to normalize 
the operation. In an unusual event, such as blockage of traffic, accidents, fires or 
severe weather conditions, there will usually be issued restructuring of services 
for a smaller period of time. 
The operator is bound to inform the traffic authority of any situations that will 
have an effect on their service(s). Besides that, there is a sanction system if the 
operator does not provide information prior to a departure, if there is no driver or 
bus for the service, and latest ten minutes after departure if a bus is delayed or 
cancelled due to a failure on the vehicle.
83
 
2.12. Awarding the contract and the system behind 
When awarding the contracts of the tender, only the winner and not the entire 
bidding process (including other operators’ bids, level of quality or quality index) 
is announced to the greater public, which is not in accordance with the regulation 
paragraph on great transparency. 
In order to understand more of the politics behind the traffic authority, the 
researcher finds it relevant to examine the traffic plan 2016 engaged by Movia 
                                                          
81
 Trafikselskabet Movia et al. 2016 pp. 150 
82
 Trafikselskabet Movia et al. 2016 pp. 151 
83
 Trafikselskabet Movia et al. 2016 pp. 151-152 
29 
 
and the owners, which are focusing mostly on the budget and the customer 
satisfaction. 
2.13. Movia political meeting February 23, 2017 (Traffic plan 2016) 
According to Movia, the owners (regions and municipalities) paid 2.78 billion 
Danish kroner for the service of buses and trains in Zealand in 2016. The buses 
were awarded 1.5 billion Danish kroner in 2016, where the operators were paid 
3.0 billion Danish kroner. Beside the 1.5 billion subsidies, 1.7 billion is from 
ticket income.
84
 The outcome of the 2016 budget was that 108 million Danish 
kroner went back to owners, as the budget on the subsidies was calculated higher 
than the actual expenses.
85
 
There seems to be a clear pattern in cutting costs for delivering bus service within 
the Movia area, as it went from 1.582 billion in 2013 to 1.520 billion in 2016, but 
this can be explained with the development in fuel prices, as the numbers of bus 
routes are the same (445) and the amount of passengers have gone from 202.1 
million in 2013 to 203.5 in 2016. 
It is though worth to notice that Movia calculated with 207.1 million passengers in 
budget for 2016.
86
 The amount of busses in service within the traffic authority is 
unchanged as well with 1.250 buses in service. 
2.14. Passenger satisfaction 
In the annual report from 2016, Movia listed their passenger satisfaction from 
2012 onwards. The percentage of passengers who are very satisfied with the 
service is between nineteen percent and twenty-one percent. This value was 
twenty-one percent in both 2012 and 2016. 
The indexes for satisfied passengers are also very close for the five years 
comparing, as it is between seventy-two percent and seventy-six percent. The 
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number was seventy-five percent in 2012 and seventy-four percent in 2016.
87
 But 
as a part of decision process for the 2016 traffic plan, there is a suggestion from 
Movia to lower the aim for very satisfied passengers down to twenty-five percent. 
This is due to the many changes which will be going on in Copenhagen, 
especially when the new metro is to open (projected for 2019).
88
 
Four municipalities did not support this proposition, including the municipality of 
Copenhagen. One of the municipalities wanted Movia to differentiate between 
city and rural districts, where one municipality suggested that the municipalities 
together with Movia worked on better marketing for satisfied customers.
89
 
Nonetheless, the suggestion was maintained and implemented in the 2016 traffic 
plan. 
In the traffic report 2016, Movia mentions that some of the key features of the 
new strategy for satisfied customers are that there is a need for more focus on the 
traffic flow for buses, a better connection interline and between bus and train, and 
better traffic information systems.
90
 
According to the report, ninety-five percent of the passengers were satisfied with 
the delivered service, but the amount of very satisfied passengers was only 
twenty-one percent, but the goal was thirty percent. Movia performed a great 
survey in 2015 on quality in service among their customers, where five-thousand 
people participated. 
The outcome of this survey was that the passengers and the key points in the 
customer satisfaction for customers riding in Copenhagen seem to reliability, time 
spent traveling and good conditions for the bus stops.
91
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One of the key features in the survey was also change-free travel, meaning that 
passengers were more satisfied if they did not have to change multiple times to get 
to their destination. It can therefore question that Movia in Copenhagen is to 
renew the whole net of buses when the next metro line opens.
92
 
The survey from 2015 resulted in some recommendations for future travel. One of 
the key recommendations was to think about traffic flow when thinking public 
transportation, and to think more of the reliability, comfort and traffic 
information.
93
 
In order to gain better reliability, some investment in bus lanes and intelligent 
traffic systems is needed, and therefore there is now a project undergoing to 
ensure better reliability started by Movia. The project is to suggest a reliability 
program which will set the frame for the investment in the regional bus net from 
2016 onwards. 
Reports show that there are advantages in investing in these reliability measures, 
as minutes can be reduced of the timetable if the buses can make the way faster 
through designated bus lanes, intelligent intersections, among others. 
Movia and Copenhagen municipality showed a great success regarding passenger 
satisfaction on the 2014 opened +way system going from central to north of 
Copenhagen.
94
 
However, the travel time has not been significant reduced as Copenhagen 
municipality never got the intelligent intersections to function, and therefore the 
services using the designated +way system were stopped on various intersections, 
instead of driving in a flow. Movia claims that in rush hour the travel time on the 
+way system has been reduced by approximately two minutes.
95
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Chapter 3: Theoretical framework 
3.1. Legal pluralism 
Legal pluralism argues that law operated by a single actor is often regulated by 
multiple legal or quasi-legal regimes,
96
 where international law can be a 
foundation of additional rights for standards and frameworks intended for 
regulations
97
. In addition, non-state actors and industry standard-setting 
organizations do exercise normative pull, which in some areas can be very 
significant.
98
 
Seeking to understand the various roles of law within globalization, legal 
pluralism gives way for a nuanced approach of how legal norms are enunciated in 
a hybrid world, where the starting premises is that multiple groups understand 
themselves to be bound by norms of a national state, municipalities or regions, 
though many norm-generating communities have great power over our actions, 
even though they are not part of the state-based system.
99
 
Pluralism recognizes that the conception of law we hold must include more than 
the official sanctioned governmental law, and that law does not dwell in the 
coercive orders of supreme power alone,
100
 as it is persistently constructed 
through the race of norm-generating communities. 
By using pluralism, it is possible to grasp a legal system which is both sovereign 
and imperfect, as outside norms affect the system, but do not fully dominate it. 
The pluralist framework captures an analytic and constant relationship that can be 
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seen in international normative communities, which positivistic visions of legal 
authority do not observe.
101
 
3.2. Legal pluralism rationale 
This research was conducted in a legal pluralist framework, as this provides an 
approach for understanding the law in society, and how the interaction between 
law, social factors, legal and non-legal actors interrelates in a hybrid world, as law 
is often regulated by several legal regimes. 
Legal pluralism is relevant as legislative supremacy establishment; like state 
institutions and EU, it is linked to the population via elections, and holds the legal 
understanding of the law, where non-governmental groups thrive for a norm-
change in the legal part of the regulation.
102
 
The social understanding of the law is comprehended through the laws of the 
national state or other legislative supremacies, which this research connects to the 
EU. It is also formed by non-governmental groups, industrial groups and the 
recent emerging social media process, representing another way for the legal 
actors and social understanding to change. 
Various actors on the Danish market and within the EU regulatory process have 
different approaches to the law and the law-making practice, which is visible in 
the following chapters. 
3.3. Governance 
The governance approach offers a scope on European politics, which has moved 
away from how and why states integrate to how the EU governed areas, and how 
non-governmental and governmental actors collaborate, and argues that the 
European integration process began to shift above member states and that 
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policymaking were more characterized by complex overlapping geographically 
structures.
103
 
The governance approach also relies on the hypothesis that the interaction of 
multiple actors is very complex, yet a dynamic system of policy making which 
involves non-governmental and governmental actors, although integration is not 
always the highest goal in the EU decision making process. The approach focuses 
on the importance of the various institutions within certain areas of governance, 
but does not focus on the institutional design.
104
 
3.4. New Governance 
Recently, a different approach to governance within the EU has gained 
momentum. The new ways of governance are more based on standards of 
performance which are more voluntary, than standard regulations. 
The new ways of governance aim to involve the participation of private actors 
when formulating new policies and are called “the Open Method of Coordination” 
and consist of four elements, which are fixed guidelines for the union with goals 
ranging from short to long, indicators and benchmarks through quantitative and 
qualitative methods, European guidelines which reaches national and regional 
policies and a mutual learning process through monitoring, evaluation and peer-
review.
105
 
The new mode of governance is unlike the previous model of governance in the 
EU, not to set a single construction of governance for all member countries, but to 
use best practice. However, it is important to notice that governance in the EU is 
largely still based on the original governance practice.
106
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One of the crucial limits that the European process making is suffering under is 
the systematic limits of non-decision; this comes to display when the 
liberalization process becomes a competition, forcing lower regulatory 
standards.
107
 
This especially shows when poor countries are competing against richer countries, 
where the poor countries are willing to lower their standards in order to keep the 
production. 
Furthermore, studies show that the negotiation between member states on a non-
hierarchical way often causes a deadlock and use of veto rights, and therefore the 
European decision process can be prolonged for months or even years.
108
 A 
removal of the veto power has showed to be more successful in order to agree on 
a decision. 
3.5. Democratic experimentalism 
In the late nineties, the theory of democratic experimentalism occurred on the 
basis of a specific logic of decision making. The theory is widely based on that 
policy networks are more often involved in political decisions
109
, which more 
specifically comes to work when industry experts or local groups are getting 
involved directly in the decision making process i.e. when a citizen committee are 
striving for better public transportation in their local community. 
The local governments have the most important task of converting the given 
information and to use it to form best practice into future performance standards. 
These performance standards motivate a network of local and regional 
government to share their best practices and draw experience from them. The 
practice is not only for local governments, but can be used in regulatory agencies 
and at national level as well. 
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The idea of democratic experimentalism is to support the representative 
democracy, where the national government can gain from local experience.
110
 
Furthermore, it offers a potential solution to some of the challenges within the EU 
governance. 
3.6. Multi-level Governance 
The model of multi-level governance describes that the national governments are 
important in the decision making process of the EU, and argues that the national 
states’ interest is more dominant in the policy making, but not solely by the state. 
The model argues that the decision-making process is shared by different level of 
actors, which means that the parliament, commissions and court of the EU have 
great influence. 
This means that even though the national states do play an important role in the 
decision-making process, it is important to examine the influence on the European 
governmental level in order to explain the policy making.
111
 Additionally, when 
individual states cluster together to make a decision on a policy, it is a loss of 
control for the individual national governments, especially because the decisions 
are made from the qualified majority when voting on policies in the EU.
112
 
Many actors are involved in multi-level governance, where both multi-states and 
non-state organization are participating in order to set new standards and norms 
and placing their understanding of the law and how to create it.
113
  
The development of the multi-level governance model can also be described as a 
development from a command and control state towards an enabling state, which 
is partly a product of many years of ‘new public management’ where the 
service/produce part of the government is separated from the democratic/political 
element of the government. 
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The main goal throughout the last 15 years for Western governments has been to 
increase efficiency within public service instead of the previous focus on the 
political field in society.
114
 
3.7. The regulatory State 
Some scholars are describing the regulatory state within the EU as a regulatory 
state inside the state, which means that regulations of the EU system regulate law 
and practices within each member state on many areas.
115
 
The rise of the regulatory state is the direct effect on the fact that EU does not 
have the budget or the bureaucratic means to inflict policies on the national states, 
and therefore the regulations are a good compromise for EU to remain in the 
authoritarian role, while giving the member states more free ways to compromise 
within the regulations.
116
 
The EU will never be able to become a state and therefore it is described as a 
regulatory state, since it exercises some key roles of statehood, but only in limited 
areas of economy and social regulations. 
3.8. Institutional regulation theory 
The regulatory process explained through the institutional theory is that public 
policies are interest of political and bureaucratic networks, often governmental, 
and that the political control of bureaucracy has the power to control the 
regulators. 
The regulators can be monitored and therefore kept politically accountable by 
strict procedural requirements, standards, executive power of appointment, 
judicial review and executive power of appointment. The theory explains that 
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when such a complex system is functional, it leaves no single authority in control 
of an independent agency, but the agency is under public control.
117
 
3.9. Governance models in land based transportation 
With many policy-making processes being started every year, in various fields of 
the EU and their member states, it is only understandable that there are different 
approaches to these and therefore one single theory is not applicable for all; so, 
when it comes to the decision-making process within the land based transportation 
area in the EU, it would be hard to state that democratic experimentalism is overly 
represented regarding policy making. 
Although especially within the railways, customer feedback is taken in concern 
when creating timetables. For buses the involvement is not much customer based, 
as in passengers, but customers in the sense of the municipalities and regions, who 
in the end are paying for the traffic authority. Since the mid 00s there has been 
more involvement from these partners within the Danish market on public 
transportation. 
Therefore, it is easy to say that there are more governmental and inter-
governmental factors involved in the processes and not the wishes of local groups 
of companies or municipalities, although new governance was more involved in 
the recent policy making process when it comes to best practices. 
The major difficulty with this model, from the transport policy view, is that every 
member state wants their best practice to be the recurring theme in the policy – 
and almost every European country has a different view on policy making within 
transportation. It is consequently clearer that multi-level governance is the key 
entry point of governance within the policy making process in this field due to this 
difficulty. 
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The member states could only agree on very few points within the recent policy, 
which made it into a very thin, but strongly framed regulation. It is evident that all 
governments wanted more efficiency, flexibility and transparency within the 
current regulation on the land based transportation area in the spirit of new public 
management. 
The national states interest and the greater EU point of interest have been very 
important, yet contradictive in the process of this policy, thus the policy ended up 
as a compromise, which the researcher discussed previously in the literature 
review. 
The advantage of working with multi-level governance especially in land based 
transportation is that at some point the member states will agree on a policy, 
although it can take significant time to develop. The final product is based on a 
will to deliver effective service that is cost-efficient. 
The disadvantage is that more member states can cluster together and push for a 
decision that may not be the best for some other member states, who often stand 
alone or in minority with their wishes or demands for their policies. 
A removal of the veto power as suggested in new governance could possibly have 
solved the problem of the long yearly process to develop the policy, but would 
probably not solve the problem of some member states being neglected. 
3.10. Legal pluralism, governance and regulations 
When the policy making is a European matter, the effect is still on the national 
states; depending on the size and aim of the regulations, a certain amount of 
national regulation is necessary. 
Within land based transport on the Danish market, the researcher is able to apply 
the institutional theory, as the local traffic authority in Denmark is under public 
control, in the sense that it does not have a single owner, but holds a vast owners 
circle of many municipalities and regions, although the regulatory policy is 
enforced by the Danish government.  
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While norm-generating communities are seeking influence in the process of both 
EU regulations and on the Danish market, the law is mostly governed by state-
actors. The regulatory process is a hybrid of multiple legal systems, 
interconnecting to find common praxis for the final regulations, to define the land 
based transportation liberalization. 
The policy from the EU specifically requires great transparency, and this goes 
along with the institutional regulation theory, as the regulated part is being 
monitored on many parameters such as economy, quality, CSR, among others. 
The Danish market is a system with strong legal sovereignty from the state actors, 
where norm-generating communities often seek influence, but without greater 
success. 
The lack of success on the Danish market for most multi-national companies is 
therefore a direct result of the above, although the Danish market is organized in a 
way where the government has no direct power over any authorities, but requests 
for yearly economical reports from the customer of the authority, which are the 
municipalities and regions. The traffic authority needs to deliver key information 
about passengers and annual reports to the government, which in turn must inform 
the EU in accordance to the policy on the area. 
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Chapter 4: Methods 
The research was conducted in three distinct parts. The first part was a 
comprehensive analysis of the literature to determine the key factors of EU law, 
the Danish market and the tenders from the authority represented in the greater 
Copenhagen area. 
The second part was a personal survey conducted with one-hundred-and-one 
customers on Copenhagen based bus services 1A, 4A, 8A and 9A, to review the 
customer insight on parts of the subsidy system. 
The third and final part was developed through interviews with five key 
individuals within the Danish market, who could provide inside knowledge from 
the operators and authority perspectives. 
4.1. Part one: Literature selection rationale 
The literature selected for the analysis required a representation of valid 
knowledge about the EU law system, especially when dealing with transport law, 
the EU and member state governance. Furthermore, it was relevant to select 
literature which also had great understanding in the various markets within the 
member states. 
The final part of the literature selection was aimed at finding insightful knowledge 
about the subsidy system within the greater Copenhagen area, where the 
researcher performs a description of the various measurement systems for quality 
control and awarding contracts. 
4.2. Keyword search 
For indentifying valid literature for analysis, this research used a keyword search 
on the online databases Google scholar and LUBsearch. The search was 
conducted using a combination of keywords: governance, EU governance, EU 
transportation policies, EU member state policies, EU regulations, EU market 
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integration, member state regulations, governance theories, transport regulations, 
traffic congestion in Copenhagen, legal pluralism and Movia subsidies. 
Followed by an analysis of the titles and abstracts, a total of twenty articles were 
selected. These included theoretical governance and legal pluralism frameworks, 
European regulation, the Danish market and the regulatory process. 
The twenty articles were combined and applied in both the literature review and 
analysis chapters. 
4.3. Reports and publications 
Another part of the search for valid literature was through reports and publications 
on the website of the traffic authority of the greater Copenhagen area – Movia. 
From this database, a total of 7 reports were selected and used for the research. 
4.4. Known literature and WebPages 
The final part of the literature search was conducted on behalf of personal 
knowledge on WebPages in which the Danish market is being described, 
including Myldretid.dk and busfronten.dk, as well as the author’s own report on 
public-private partnerships in public transportation in Copenhagen. 
Literature search on traffic congestion in Copenhagen for the analysis was also 
conducted using the Copenhagen Municipality’s and the TomTom GPS 
company’s websites. 
4.5. Part two: Personal survey with passengers 
The purpose of the survey was to collect quantitative data, representing the 
passengers’ point of view, to complete the analysis with significant primary data. 
This part of the research provided insight to a very constricted part of the Danish 
market and stood out, when compared to the surveys which Movia conducts on 
the quality of their service. 
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The survey was conducted on two different occasions: the first round was 
conducted on March 11th for passengers traveling on line 8A and on March 12th 
for customers traveling on 4A. In order to hold neutral position regarding both 
authority and operators, the survey was conducted outside, near the vehicles on 
terminating stops Nordhavn Station and Svanemøllen Station around midday on 
both days. Sixty people were invited to attend the survey, where forty-eight 
accepted – out of those, twenty-three were on line 8A and twenty-five on line 4A. 
The second round was conducted on May 15th for passengers traveling on line 1A 
and line 9A. This survey was, like the first round, conducted outside of the 
terminating stops at Hvidovre Hospital and Refshaleøen from midday to early 
afternoon. Sixty people were invited to attend the survey, where fifty-three 
accepted – out of those thirty were traveling on line 1A and twenty-three on line 
9A. 
4.5.1. Conduction of survey and ethical considerations 
In order to conduct a personal quantitative survey with many participants it is 
important to identify the target population
118
, which for this research were 
passengers traveling with the A-bus system. 
The study followed a random recruitment process, focusing on approaching 
participants one at a time, for a small questionnaire consisting of four individual 
questions. The researcher decided to conduct the surveys in four different 
locations within the A-bus system, and verbally approached the individuals to 
receive consent to participate in the questionnaire. 
The researcher explained the aim of the research and then asked the four questions 
to the respondent, while typing the answers into the handheld computer. The 
surveys were conducted face to face in order to ensure a relaxed and informal 
environment. 
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Each survey lasted an average of two to three minutes, where some of the 
respondents had follow-up questions to the research, which led to extended 
conversations about the subsidies of the services in Copenhagen. None of these 
conversations were included in the research. 
The survey was performed speaking Danish, and the answers written in English 
by the researcher. Afterwards, the participants were invited to check their answers 
for confirmation. 
In order to ensure the sincerity of the participants, all questionnaires were 
conducted on an anonymous basis. The researcher did not collect any names of 
the participants. 
All participants were randomly selected and therefore none of them were known 
to the researcher prior to this survey. This increased the reliability of the research, 
as it ensured honesty when participating in the survey. 
4.6. Survey design and results 
The survey was designed to achieve knowledge on the user perspective on 
delivered quality of service, on the A bus system in Copenhagen. Divided into 
four questions, two of them were designed to be only ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers and 
the remaining two were designed using a Likert scale from ‘very low’ or ‘very 
rare’ to ‘very high’ or ‘very often’. 
The data was collected into separate excel files marked with “participant” 
followed by a number. In the process of analyzing the data, all participant answers 
were transferred into a separate excel file for each of the two conducted surveys. 
The data collection is presented in the chapter of results. 
4.7. Part three: Personal interviews and ethical considerations 
Using a research interview conversation, the researcher obtains information on 
people’s perceptions, views and opinions, in their own words. Following specific 
rules and techniques, a structure and a purpose, the research interview represents a 
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professional conversation, where knowledge is created through the collaboration 
between researcher and interviewer.
119
 
Conversations have for long been used as a mean of constructing systematic 
knowledge. Particularly in social sciences, research interviews are gradually 
increasing as a method, as there is also a focus on the social construction of 
knowledge.
120
 
In this study, interviews were chosen as a way to achieve knowledge from 
individuals, in order to make the research more reliable. The key individuals 
selected for interviews have all obtained knowledge on the Danish market in the 
greater Copenhagen area, for a consistent amount of years. 
There are key ethical issues to considerate when performing a research interview. 
The information obtained from this method is highly dependent on the social 
relationship between researcher and interviewee and on the interviewer’s skills. 
The participant must feel free and safe to talk about delicate or confidential 
matters, whereas the interviewer ensures respect and the privacy of the 
interviewee.
121
 
Verbal consent was provided for each interview, upon description of the research 
questions and overall aim of this research. It is relevant to indicate that the 
researcher was known to the participants prior to the interview, as part of 
businesses/companies himself worked with.  
Questions were posed in a neutral manner, to avoid possible bias and leading the 
interviewee to a certain answer. Once the interview was finalized, each of the 5 
key individuals read and agreed with the English-written transcription. 
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All key personal is anonymous in this research, due to privacy issues and in order 
to supply this research with the greatest honesty possible. The individuals were all 
known by the researcher prior to the interviews. 
4.7.1 Part three: Conduction of interviews with key personal 
Five individuals were chosen to participate in this research - three of these 
individuals were from the operators and two were from the traffic authority. All 
participants were working in different functions within the subsidy and quality 
measurement system. 
The interviews with all individuals from the operators were based on the 
questionnaire from the passenger survey, but in order to obtain a full range of 
information, they were conducted in a semi-structured approach, which made 
room for adding questions or elaborating if needed. 
The interviews with the contract worker and quality measurement system worker 
from the authority were conducted as a dialogue, based on the presented research 
and the passenger survey questionnaire. These interviews were also conducted in 
a semi-structured approach. 
The interviews were verbally agreed on before conducted, and were all conducted 
in the offices of the interviewed individuals. Conducting the interviews in a 
familiar environment has the purpose of creating a relaxed and professional 
atmosphere.
122
 
At first, the aim of the research was presented to the individuals, who had the 
possibility of asking questions regarding the subject. Thereafter, the interviews 
were conducted. The researcher transcribed the interviews from Danish to English 
on a computer while they were conducted, without the use of a recording device. 
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As mentioned in the ethical considerations, at the end of the interview, each 
participant read their own transcript and verbally agreed with what was written by 
the interviewer. All interviews lasted between fifteen and thirty minutes. 
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Chapter 5: Empirical results 
Chapter 5.1: The connection between theory and the primary data 
While a significant part of the collected literature covers the EU regulatory 
process, the Danish market and the quality measurement system, the surveys and 
key interviews focus on the effect of the EU regulatory process on the Danish 
market within the greater Copenhagen area, and how the quality measurement 
system is functioning within the various roles between traffic authority and 
operators. 
The survey conducted with the passengers represents how the quality 
measurement system, A-bus services and subsidy process affect the passenger’s 
attitude towards these factors. 
The interviews with key individuals in the greater Copenhagen area focus on how 
the described literature on the EU regulatory process, the Danish market and 
quality measurement system relates to the various interviewees’ positions, and 
how they perceive the law and the norm-generating process. 
5.2. Survey results 
Question 1 Delivered services on A-buses in Copenhagen: Which level of quality do you feel is being delivered?   
  Very high High Mediocre Low Very low 
    
  
  0 8 16 8 16 
    
  
    
        
  
Question 2 Do you feel that Movia is trying to raise the quality level on A-buses?       
    Yes 
 
No 
     
  
    16 
 
32 
     
  
                      
Question 3 Do you in generally feel that the A-buses deliver timely service?         
  Very often Often Sometimes Rare Very rare 
    
  
  0 8 8 32   
    
  
                      
Question 4 Do you think it would improve the delivered quality if a bus is cancelled when it is more delayed than the bus behind? 
    Yes 
 
No 
     
  
    16 
 
32 
     
  
                     
Figure 1. Illustration of survey results obtained from the first round. 
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As mentioned in the methodology, the survey with passengers was conducted on 
two separate occasions, and the results of the first conducted survey is that fifty 
percent responded low or very low when asked about delivered quality, eighty-
seven percent mediocre or lower for the question on quality raising in the A-bus 
system, sixty-six percent ‘no’ on the timely service, and finally, eighty-three 
percent answered sometimes or lower on the question about more timely service if 
a bus is cancelled. 
Question 1 Delivered services on A-buses in Copenhagen: Which level of quality do you feel is being delivered?   
  Very high High Mediocre Low Very low 
   
  
  2 10 10 28 3 
   
  
                    
Question 2 Do you feel that Movia is trying to raise the quality level on A-buses?       
  
 
Yes 
 
No 
    
  
  
 
8 
 
45 
    
  
                    
Question 3 Do you in generally feel that the A-buses deliver timely service?         
  Very often Often Sometimes Rare Very rare 
   
  
    5 15 28 5 
   
  
                    
Question 4 Do you think it would improve the delivered quality if a bus is cancelled when it is more delayed than the bus behind? 
  
 
Yes 
 
No 
    
  
  
 
8 
 
45 
    
  
 
                  
Figure 2. Illustration of survey results obtained from the second round. 
The second-round survey has similar results, as a higher number of participants in 
this survey had a negative opinion towards the questions. The results of this 
survey shows that sixty percent answered low or very low on the question for 
delivered service in the A-bus system, seventy-five percent mediocre or lower on 
the question asking if Movia are trying to raise the level of quality, eighty percent 
answered ‘no’ on the question for timely service and finally eighty percent 
answered ‘no’ when asked if it would improve the quality if some buses were 
cancelled. 
The results of the survey led the researcher to the conclusion that there is a clear 
tendency of a more negative attitude towards the delivered service of the A-bus 
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system; very few of the responses were ‘very often/high’ when presented as an 
opportunity. Standing out in this survey is the answers on the question of 
delivered timely service, where the majority of the answers pointed on rare. The 
result of the customer survey was taken into consideration and discussion, in the 
later interviews with key personal in the Danish market. 
5.3. Key informant interview 1 ‘Operational manager’ 
When discussing the level of quality, the key interviewee stated that the operator 
did not have any help or will from the traffic authority to raise the level – but at 
the same time there is a huge pressure to keep the quality index high and the fines 
low. Often the operator is to find their own solutions in order to higher the level of 
quality. 
Digital solutions have not yet been the success from the operators’ perspective as 
wanted, and many customers go through the bus without noticing the quality or 
measurements to improve the quality, so the key is to influence those few who 
really notice the quality in a positive way. This is an area which often is in the 
hands of the driver, so therefore it is important to motivate the driver to take part 
of this. 
In the dialogue regarding how the traffic authority is trying to increase the level of 
quality, he repeats that this is almost never the case. The quality system on bonus 
or fines is the factor in which the authority is more interested. The experiences 
that the customers have when they sit in the buses are hardly influenced by the 
authority. 
He continues and says that they are getting fines for an outside destination sign 
which does not light up and shows the line, but he can hardly see how this has an 
influence on how the customer sees their quality of delivered service. He has 
never heard any customer state that they were unsatisfied because one of the 
destination signs did not work. There is a lack of collaboration on these things, he 
finished. 
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In the third discussion on the question regarding punctuality, he states that the A 
bus system does not deliver timely service, which is often due to the lack of 
interest from the traffic authority, but also the municipalities. It is not existing, he 
says. The operators have many times tried to create solutions, which often are not 
a high pressure on the budgets, but there is no will to either listen or do anything -
the operators are stuck with lower customer satisfaction measurements, due to not 
being able to deliver timely service, which again is due to the lack of engagement 
by the authorities. 
He continues on the fourth question on delayed services that if a bus is cancelled 
it would not improve quality, because then the customers need to get off the 
delayed bus and board the next. This is not a good way to improve the timeliness 
of the delivered service. 
He states that another way of providing timely service is to frequently control, but 
this would be hard as all shifts are steady – and once more they would reach into a 
problem in their contracts, because the operator is paid for a fixed amount of 
hours. He finishes by saying that there is a lot of mistrust within the present form 
of contracts between authority and operator. 
5.4. Key informant interview 2 ‘Operational assistant’ 
Discussing the level of quality, he states that taking in consideration the city size, 
the interval between the buses on the A-bus system is reasonable, but it does not 
seem like the traffic authority takes any interest in trying to higher the level of the 
quality in delivered product when it comes to this system. 
Many of the A-buses are stuck in traffic and therefore it is very difficult to deliver 
a timely service. The traffic situation, especially in Copenhagen municipality, is a 
direct consequence of numerous cars, lack of traffic solutions and focus on 
removing parking spaces, giving room for more bike lanes and not considering 
bus lanes. 
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If the traffic authority was to engage contracts where delayed services were 
cancelled mid-route, it would not improve the quality of delivered service, as the 
buses would most likely be stuck in traffic anyway on their way to the terminus 
point. 
5.5. Key informant interview 3 ‘Quality manager’ 
The discussion began on the quality of the delivered service in the A-bus system, 
where he stated that the idea of the A-bus system is good and it can function, but 
the problem lays in that the traffic authority continually focuses on economy. 
Every aspect of the system is about economy instead of focusing on the 
passengers, and that is the reason why the project does not function very well. It 
does not seem that the operators can administrate the A-bus system, but instead 
have to deliver in accordance of the wishes from the traffic authority. 
If one operator was to win all the A-buses in the system or several A-buses and 
place them on the same depot, there might be a way for the operator(s) to 
influence the traffic authority and the quality of delivered service and product. 
He continues and states that one of the operators just started a project on one of 
the A-services that aims to provide the customers with the promised interval 
between services, which is five to seven minutes depending on the time of the 
day. This has recently been an opening in the contracts so that the operators can 
more openly administrate their services. so that the timetable and interval are in 
general more articulate. 
If the trail is successful, it is to be implemented on all A-services. 
On other services than the A-lines, the contracts are still too focused on the 
economical part and the contracts, especially the contracts where the incentive 
part is not being used. He continues and states that the collaboration for the traffic 
authority is linked to the conjectures. When there is a plunge in customers, the 
traffic authority seems to engage in more campaigns and collaborations, but when 
there are more customers the engagement disappears. 
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On the question on delivered timeliness he states that because of massive 
problems with the accessibility, especially in the municipality of Copenhagen, and 
the lack of flexibility in the contracts, it is very difficult to deliver timely service 
on the A-bus network. If a bus is to be cancelled because it is late, it would not be 
very positively seen from the customers’ perspective, as they rather want a 
delayed service, and they hardly notice when two services come just after one 
another, taken in mind that there is no psychical timetable available. He finishes 
by expressing that the traffic authority directly tells the operators, that their 
customer is them, not the customers. 
5.6. Key informant interview 4 ‘Contract worker’ 
The length of the contracts within the Greater Copenhagen area is quite long – 
they can last up to twelve years – which, according to the contract worker, is 
“longer than most marriages nowadays”. And it is not easy to just “get a divorce” 
from these contracts from any of the parts. The operator and the traffic authority 
hold two different roles, where the authority is having a political bottom-line, the 
operators have an economical bottom-line. This can result in various conflicts of 
interest between the two parts. 
When having different roles, there has to be a great sense of equal treatment 
among all the operators and this is a great focus area from the traffic authority. 
The importance of treating every operator equally is especially profound in the 
cases where some operators do not perform accordingly to their contracts; 
therefore other operators would wonder why they would spend considerable fiscal 
and labor force to perform better. 
The level of delivered quality can for some operators be a curve which goes up 
and down over the length of the contract, and if the authority did not have any 
tools to deal with the downward side of the curve, there is a chance that the curve 
would never stop going down until hitting the bottom. 
This is of course not applicable for all operators, but there are previous and recent 
cases of some or great negligence of contracts. He continues and says that the 
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traffic authority in Copenhagen is trying to follow-up on the quality in a way that 
it makes sense, but there is a long way from management, to the traffic service 
personal on the streets. 
The best example on negligence from an operator was in the previous subsidy 
called ‘HUR 10’, where one operator won all the buses and did not have anything 
under control. At that time, the traffic authority truly began to focus on the 
delivered quality and some measures were taken to tighten up the grip of all 
contracts. 
It is also relevant to put the Danish or Copenhagen model in focus when 
comparing to other European countries, on an international level, as the 
Copenhagen model seem to be the strongest according to a so far non-published 
report. There seem to be a great transparency and dialogue/cooperation with the 
operators from the authority side. 
One of the discussions that is being repeated in EU transportation is if subsidies 
should be line or area based, where Denmark and Copenhagen is line based, 
Stockholm for example are based on depots, where a whole depot is up for tender 
at a time. One of the challenges of subsiding per line is that it becomes very 
transparent, and the operator cannot cover themselves. 
The quality delivered at a customer level are becoming much more transparent, 
thus it develops increased competition and Copenhagen is one of few authorities 
in Europe who has more than sixteen operators – and this is directly due to the 
subsidies on lines instead of areas or depots. 
According to him, the operators are not always effective at focusing on how sound 
their product is and how they deliver. He continues by saying that the customer 
satisfaction is slowly rising within Copenhagen where in addition, there have been 
less economical fines and fines for breaches in quality within the Copenhagen 
area. This is due to a better focus on transparency, higher focus or a different 
focus from a new operator through subsidies. 
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Some operators are fined less because they are more engaged in their business and 
their contracts, and therefore have a stronger focus on the delivered quality of 
service. However, all actors must be treated equally and therefore there has to be a 
system that meets the delivered quality – the way the system works can always be 
discussed. 
5.7. Key informant interview 5 ‘Quality control agent’ 
The system to measure the delivered service and the quality measurement system 
has changed greatly in recent time; from the authority’s side, there is now a focus 
on fixed amount of fines, where all quality control agents had to check four-
hundred buses a month and had to write fifty fines, which is one in every eight 
busses they would control. 
According to the quality control agent, it is not possible to find all these flaws and 
it would become senseless to do so. The agents issued therefore many so-called 
‘zero fines’, which indicates that the operator will not get penalized yet, but if the 
same bus has the same mistake occurring again, it will. This is normal procedure 
in the quality measurement system. 
Nonetheless, the authority would not accept these ‘zero fines’ and the new focus 
on giving a fixed amount of fines has increased both the short-term and long-term 
sickness leave statistics, which has risen three point five times more than before 
this system was taken in use. Moreover, if an agent does not complete fifty fines a 
month, there is a risk of receiving a written warning. 
He highlights the fact that the authority has released a top list of which agents are 
handing out most fines, and where these top lists, in many companies, have 
encouraged workers to work harder, smarter or better. This system it is not in 
good use for a workplace that spends a great amount of time engaging in a 
dialogue with the operators. 
The new system of fixed fines seems to be on retreat as many agents have 
complained; although the system is still focusing on the fines, they will adjust 
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their level every week to the median of the given fines per agent - so if it is eight 
fines one week per agent in median, it will become eight for the next week and so 
on. 
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Chapter 6: Analysis 
6.1. Regulatory challenges 
The EU member states struggled to agree upon both the first and second 
regulation for the land based transportation area, due to several legal interests. 
Furthermore, the regulations are not very extensive compared to most regulations 
within the EU, although it represents the best outcome of the legal understandings 
of dissimilar requests and demands from the member states in the working 
progress. 
According to legal pluralism, legal norms are understood in a hybrid world by a 
connection of a national state or norm-generating communities to the law, which 
can explain why the process was prolonged and troublesome when creating the 
regulation. Each member state is operating a different market with different 
versions of transportation law, which they all sought to engage in the European 
regulation. 
Moreover, many multi-national transportation companies have been pushing for 
influence through lobbyism or inter-governmental work, with their understanding 
of how the law should be processed and understood for their benefit in the 
liberalization of the European market. 
The recent regulation holds the most important principles of post new public 
management in multi-level governance and the core of the EU - the free market. 
The regulation is engaging in more transparency and more competitiveness 
between the private operators, who are operating on behalf of a public subsidy, 
although it also leaves space for those national states who continually want to 
have a state-owned operator within the free market, competing on the same terms 
as the private operators. 
One of these operators is the public owned Århus Sporveje of Århus, Denmark, 
who continues to operate the city buses in Århus since 1928. There are no public 
operators in the greater Copenhagen area; as mentioned in the literature review, 
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Van de Velde highlights that the public owned operators did not have any success 
in the free market nationwide or in the greater Copenhagen area. 
The recent regulation is the superlative outcome of a multi-level governed 
regulation process and is appropriate for the single member-states, as it meets the 
demands of liberalization and national-state interest. The regulation sets the 
standards of transparency, length of contracts and agreement of the free market. In 
theory, the regulation aims that, in every country within the EU, all operators are 
operating and participating in subsidies on equal terms; however, in practice it is 
not so, as the example of the German market presented in the literature review. 
It is clear that each market has different terms of operation, where some markets 
like the German has lower operations, salary costs and benefits, but longer 
working hours. The driver cost in Denmark is significantly higher, the working 
hours are lower and there are greater benefits, especially fiscal benefits on the 
Danish market compared to the German. 
The salaries are in general lower in the Eastern and Southern Europe compared to 
the Nordic countries. Therefore, in practice, the regulation is adequate for the 
single market of every European country, but does not support an inter-European 
market where e.g. a German company can participate on German salary and labor 
market terms within a Danish subsidy, which for the national state is beneficial, 
but in the free market thoughts of the Rome tractate, not completely coherent. 
The regulation is therefore a very clear example in which national interest and 
multi-level governance are appropriate for the regulation making, for the land 
based transportation area in the EU. The free market as wished in the Rome 
tractate is not applicable in the current regulation, but the market is liberalized and 
open, and the EU member states will never be able to merge into one single inter-
European market. 
The regulation on the land based transportation area ensures that all governments 
within the EU are operating on the same terms and that both national and 
international operators are free to move cross-border to participate in subsidies, 
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however it has to be done within the market of the country where the subsidy is 
taking place. This explains why big actors like First (UK), Arriva (UK), Deutsche 
Bahn (DE), Keolis (FR), Transdev (FR), Nobina (SE), Alsa (ES), Avanza (ES) 
had great success of expanding around the European markets. Most national states 
also have larger bus operators with greater success i.e. Anchersen (DK), Dito Bus 
(DK), Bent Thykjær (DK), Connexxion (NL) and Busslink (SE). 
The regulatory issues are most outspoken inside the member-states, when they are 
to define their demands for the subsidies, where the traffic authority in the greater 
Copenhagen area has formed very strong demands for their operators over time, 
as described in the literature review. 
The demands cover everything from the color of the vehicle to how much the 
floor can tilt. This is to ensure a streamlined product that appears similar for the 
passengers, no matter which operator operates the service. Some of the issues that 
may emerge are the different expectations to the quality measurement system, 
where traffic authority and operator are not always in agreement. 
This is in direct strand with multi-governance and legal pluralism, where the 
traffic authority, as government agency, always has the final say, even though 
some actors understand the regulatory laws in another norm-set conception. 
6.2. The Danish model in the greater Copenhagen area 
The greater Copenhagen area has for more than twenty-five years been a subject 
to subsidies within public transportation, and what originally started as a 
privatization process is now a self-regulated market in which the free market 
powers thrive at its best. This is in thread with institutional regulation on the 
market, as all actors are equal and can be held accountable for the action 
throughout a system that monitors every actor and their roles, which I will discuss 
later in this section. 
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On the Danish market, especially within the greater Copenhagen area, the market 
has always regulated itself as Van De Velde
123
 mentions, and the operators who 
cannot deliver and underbid, fail to succeed in the very harsh environment of the 
Danish market, where the profit margin is most of time only around two to four 
percent. While the market has been dominated by international actors since the 
early 1990s, they are currently losing momentum due to upcoming Danish actors 
who understand the development of the market, which has recently changed from 
a more fiscal orientated to a fiscal and quality oriented market. 
While much of the bus scene in Copenhagen has been challenged until around the 
mid 2000s/early 2010s, by operators who continually underbid and had troubles 
deliver the promised service, the market has lately been changed into more focus 
on the delivered quality with a system that focuses more on control, then on trust. 
The Danish market has developed from an internal-, national-, governmental 
decision-making process market, to a market where privatization of the buses in 
the Copenhagen area entered the intergovernmental decision-making process 
within the EU, to open and regulate the market within all the member states. The 
Danish market stands out according to the traffic authority of greater Copenhagen 
in transparency and involvement of operators, and is working better than most 
European markets due to the principles of institutional regulation. 
This is visible due to the equal treatment of all operators, bearing in mind that 
some operators want to perform very well and have an internal system that wants 
to do better than promised by contracts, where other operators are satisfied with 
reaching their quality numbers, and some struggle to deliver. It is therefore not 
unusual that the operators who are actively trying to perform well or better than 
promised in their contracts are receiving fewer fines than the operators who 
struggle to perform, but nonetheless, the system is based on controlling each unit 
equally. Accordingly, when some operators feel that the authority is too strict, it 
might just be the system in function. 
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6.3. The quality measurement system 
The quality measurement system is an excellent example of a multi-level 
governance framework, where the institutional regulation system functions as the 
State; regions and municipalities trust a regulatory system that meets all actors 
equally, in a structure where all are responsible for delivering a certain result for 
the chain to function. The researcher has referred to this system as the chain of 
operations, in this study. 
The quality measurement system itself and the process of assessment of the 
operators performing in it, is according to some operators not equivalent, and 
there is a wish for a system which is based more on cooperation and trust, than the 
system based on control which is in operation, however, there have been many 
cases of operators performing in upwards and downwards spirals which are 
inconsistent and not very responsive towards the passengers who are using those 
services. 
Some operators interpret an understanding of the legal framework differently than 
the authority and this occasionally surfaces as disputes, where the authority, as 
state actor, must act. This often results in a norm-change that will affect all 
operators in the quality measurement system. 
According to the authority, it is necessary to keep the control based system in 
function, as there are some cases of negligence from some operators, especially 
prior to the 2010s. It is important for the authority to keep a strong grasp on all 
operators, in order to ensure that all deliver according to their contract. This is one 
example of the strict standards mentioned in the institutional regulation theory to 
monitor the regulation, and ensure that the political system behind continually 
delivers parameters that can be measured to track all participating actors. 
The way in which the quality control system functions is a constant debate within 
both operators and authority, but the opinions are not always the same. In the 
chain of operations, the authority has its political background and customers; the 
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operators have a more economical approach as their customers are, first of all, the 
stakeholders. 
The passengers are a common customer for the two, but are not first priority per 
se, although passengers are the key to all actors in the chain of operations and are 
themselves part of the chain. However, in order to maintain the satisfaction at a 
customer level on the political background, there is a demand for timely, high 
quality, low expense service that serves the citizens in a satisfactory manner, so 
whenever the traffic authority can deliver that, there is mostly a satisfactory mood 
among their customers. 
For the operators to maintain satisfied customers, it is necessary to perform well 
within their contracts, as a higher success rate and lower fines will release more 
bonuses from the traffic authority. 
So why are all operators not performing flawless service? Mostly because there 
are several different business models, where some operators maintain a flat 
organization with direct contact, high maintenance, personal happiness and a will 
to deliver highly than the promised budgets and quality. Some operators have a 
top-down organization, where there is almost no contact between management 
and service, with a minor part of personal and maintenance focus, and where there 
is little focus to deliver above budgets and quality levels. 
It is often the operators with the top-down organizations that fail to regain 
contracts and lose momentum on the Danish market. It is also these operators who 
are more likely to get more fines during quality control sessions, as well as 
delivering a lower degree of service compared to the operators who have flat 
organizations. However, this system has lately been challenged by the authority 
who wanted their agent to a fixed amount of fines per month, which has caused 
some dissatisfaction among the operators. 
The main focus within the greater Copenhagen area has more recently developed 
to be the quality measurement system and the delivered quality, as the 
development of greater technology and information systems has made 
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institutional regulations, within multi-level governance, a fairer way of measuring 
these multiple parameters on the land based transportation area. 
According to the traffic authority, there are many satisfied passengers within the 
area and these numbers are rising in a slow but steady tempo towards higher 
quality. These numbers are though expected to decline again over the next ten 
years, as Copenhagen is focusing more on the developing metro system which is 
to be opened around 2019. 
The quality measurement system is deeply associated with the subsidy process 
now, as the quality is more important than price itself in the subsidy process, and 
the level of quality that has been used by the operators in the tenders has increased 
rapidly. 
The different municipalities and the region around Copenhagen have all agreed on 
a new network of buses, which will leave most of the inner city out of high 
frequent A-bus services. And even though the analyzing reports on passenger 
satisfaction and habits in Copenhagen state that passengers value not only fast and 
frequent service, but journey with less changes more, the idea of the new network 
is to result in passengers to change from bus to metro or the other way around, 
where service today is directly possible by bus. 
As an effect on the new network, there is a common understanding and 
acknowledgement that this will result in less satisfied passengers. It therefore 
raises a concern in this research, when the quality measurement system and the 
latest subsidies are based on higher satisfied customers and delivered service, 
when subsequently the network is changed and the municipalities are expected a 
lower passenger satisfaction. 
According to one of the operators in the greater Copenhagen area, one of the key 
concerns is that the traffic authority does not assist the operators in raising the 
level of quality. Therefore, it is up to the operator to stand alone on this subject, 
which can be a challenging process, as the operator does not have any effect on 
the municipal decision-making process regarding intelligent bus lanes, 
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intersections or traffic issues, which is one of the flaws in the chain of operations, 
as these concerns cannot be escalated to a higher level. This way, the operator 
calls for more cooperation between authority and operator to solve these issues. 
It is the same concern raised by the operators, when talking about the quality 
measurement system. Some of the fines seem to be simple bureaucracy for 
“smaller things” as a passenger information sign which is blank, but according to 
the traffic authority as earlier discussed, it is important to set standards and to treat 
every operator equally, however, in order for the institutional regulation to work it 
is also important not to accept flaws, even though they seem meaningless from the 
operators’ point of view, as the monitoring is necessary for the strict system e.g. 
with the passenger information that does not turn on and show the destination of 
the service. 
Some operators are operating to immediately secure the mistakes accordingly with 
their contract, and therefore find the fines very strict and unnecessary, while other 
operators would let the bus be in service all day with the error if not fined, since 
they would not think of it as a contractual important matter. Therefore, it is 
important to fine according to the traffic authority, as it is crucial not to lose the 
grasp on the operators; some might not be able to self-regulate, which in the end 
would lead to a negative passenger experience. 
Even though some operators never receive negative feedback in the customer 
measurements about, for example, signs which are not turned on, it is only 
because of the strong fine/bonus system, since operators are more likely to act if 
they get fined and therefore the bus will not stay in service with a broken 
information system more than accepted. 
The quality measurement system is to a large extent a sovereign state law based 
system, but multiple legal regimes are present, as it is affected by the operators 
and authority customers who have their own conception of the law. Some 
operators are following the system set by state standards, where others conceive 
the system to their advantage, often functioning as norm-generating actors. This 
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norm-generating process can result in both improvements and diminishments in 
the system. 
The customers of the authority often thrust for norm changes when it comes to 
environmental issues and larger citizen complaints, where the operators are 
working towards a norm change on easing up the system towards a more trust-
based system. 
So far it has been largely unsuccessful for non-state actors to influence the system 
in their norm-generating process, but especially due to the increasing traffic in 
Copenhagen, the system has lately been more open to changes. 
6.4. The A-bus system in Copenhagen 
The traffic authority, operators and passengers all agree that the A-bus system 
(which lately developed into an A-bus + C-line no. 5 system) is essential to 
Copenhagen, but it holds some challenges. 
The challenges, according to the operators, are that the system is very focused on 
economy and not on the passengers. It is often expected from the municipalities 
and traffic authority that the system runs through central and suburb Copenhagen 
without any challenges, but these are in fact several, where traffic is the most 
outstanding one.  
The passengers react quickly to delays and hardly have any understanding the 
reasons hereof. All key personal at the operators that was interviewed for this 
research stated that the municipality of Copenhagen and the traffic authority did 
not do enough to meet this traffic challenges. 
According to an analysis from Tomtom, the commuting population of 
Copenhagen is to experience one-hundred hours extra compared to a free-flow 
city
124
; the number of hours was sixty-one hours in 2012 and seventy-one hours in 
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2013
125
, so it is clear that there is a rising congestion problem in Copenhagen. 
Furthermore in 2014 only twenty-four percent of the population in Copenhagen 
used public transportation – however it is important to notice that thirty-six 
percent used a bicycle, so the share of journeys in car are only forty percent.
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Recently, a new system to meet the challenges of the A-bus system was started by 
one of the operators, by aiming to keep the interval between services. This is 
operated by actively regulating services, where some might move forward on the 
line without customer, in order to gain the lost minutes due to various delays, 
often caused by traffic. 
But this system has for many years been functioning on a minor scale at the 
operators to actively take delayed services out of the line and move them forward 
in order to make the service timelier, where this new system is not only based on 
when traffic goes wrong, but is to be active daily to ensure that the passengers feel 
that the promised interval between services are being met. 
One of the foremost concerns within the operators is that the continual congestion 
in Copenhagen and delayed services will affect the customer satisfaction index, 
which the traffic authority uses to pay out bonuses or hand out fines for either 
delivering or not being able to deliver service according to their contracts. 
According to the traffic authority, it can always be discussed how the various 
systems are functioning and how the improvements should be when introducing 
new systems. The new flow-system on the A-bus services is arguably introducing 
a main point from democratic experimentalism into the chain of operations, where 
the regulatory State in local areas is learning from best practices. 
6.5. Passenger focus and the chain of operations 
As discussed earlier, there is a chain of operations within the greater Copenhagen 
area which is in thread with institutional regulation and, as also discussed, the 
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focus is not directly on the passengers, where the traffic authority and the 
operators each has their main customers that come prior to the passenger focus.  
The passenger focus is therefore a direct product of the customer focus from those 
two parts, where each has to focus on and serve the passengers in order to satisfy 
their customers, which translates into a very complex system. 
But it is functioning as described in the institutional regulation theory, where the 
authority is under public control due to a system that functions under the lines that 
no single authority is in control of an independent agency e.g., politicians in the 
municipalities are interested in being reelected, therefore there is a need for 
general satisfaction with the public transportation in the municipality; the 
politicians want timely and high quality service which the traffic authority must 
provide.  
This institutional system on the customer focus is in thread with legal pluralism, 
as law regulated by a single actor is represented and regulated in multiple legal 
regimes. The passengers are influenced by both state and non-state actors in the 
norm-generating process, and therefore have different understandings of the 
customer relationship with the traffic authority, compared to the traffic authority 
point of view. 
The main customer to assure for any of the parts involved is not the passenger, but 
it is important to keep the passenger satisfied, in order to maintain a healthy 
customer relationship. The passengers perceive that the legal system and the 
subsidy process are about them. 
The municipalities, regions and operators have a different approach to the legal 
relationship with the traffic authority, and in order to perform timely and high 
quality service, the traffic authority must organize a contract with an operator that 
can perform accordingly. If they cannot perform, there must be a system that 
ensures the operator is encouraged by a fine/bonus system, depending on the 
performance. 
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The chain of operations functions accordingly with the institutional regulation 
where there are no single owners of the authority, the chain of operations has to 
function and all actors has to perform within a contract or a demand from another 
part. The complex system seems to function very well within the greater 
Copenhagen area, where the chain can also be reversed. 
The operators need the traffic authority to perform on planning and traffic service, 
and the traffic authority is used by the municipality as an agency of guidance 
when planning cancellations, diversions or greater changes in the municipal 
network. This chain of operations is only broken when the municipalities or 
regions have to make cuts in their budgets. 
The passenger satisfaction is high in the greater Copenhagen area and is, as 
discussed, still on the rise. However, when investigating into specific parts of the 
system, as this research did, it is clear that some passengers where unsatisfied 
with the level of quality and timely service. The survey conducted for this 
research showed more than half were unsatisfied with the A-bus system when 
interviewed on some A-bus services and many respondents did not feel that the 
traffic authority was doing enough to lift the level of the delivered product. 
The passenger focus has developed through contracts and demands as one of the 
main themes for both operators and traffic authority, and it is with a joint focus to 
lift this in the greater Copenhagen area. The phenomenon of passenger 
satisfaction has risen with the access to social media and that subsidies are 
increasingly focusing on quality of delivered service, more than the price of 
delivered service alone. As described above in the circle of operations, the 
importance of satisfaction is present on every level and it is therefore important to 
keep improving in this area, to ensure a continual progress. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
Land based transportation in the greater Copenhagen area is based on an EU 
regulatory structure, which affects the national subsidy process. This process is 
under constant influence by the quality measurement system, where the focus, 
when awarding contracts, has changed from a fiscal only politic to a combination 
of fiscal and delivered quality. 
The regulatory process has been formed by both state and non-state actors, who 
have been seeking influence by their understanding of a common European 
regulation, but these many norm-setting groups have been unable to agree on a 
larger inter-European regulation. 
The current regulation encourages national markets within the European 
regulation to develop within the national state, instead of having to bring most 
decisions into a common European decision board. The current regulation is 
therefore a standard framework of entry, in which all member countries have to 
form their subsidy process accordingly to the liberalization process. 
On the Danish market, this standard made way for the traffic authorities to 
formulate their demands for the operators in the subsidy process, where the traffic 
authorities in the greater Copenhagen area have always been first-movers on these 
standards, and the authorities in the greater Copenhagen area have enjoyed an 
important position on the Danish market. 
The current traffic authority in the greater Copenhagen area holds a great and 
significant position as the negotiator for their customer base, which are the 
municipalities and regions of the area. Furthermore, there is considerable amount 
of transparency in the subsidy process and within the quality measurement system 
which has represented a greater role in the subsidy process. 
The Danish market within the greater Copenhagen area shows considerable 
competition between operators, holding a large number of operators compared to 
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other markets, due to a model where lines instead of depots are being put up for 
tenders. 
The Danish market is a suitable example of the development from traditional 
governance into multi-level governance, where the regulatory State in form of 
institutional regulation is effective. The system is not without flaws, but the idea 
of subsiding lines instead of packages or depots has provided many operators, 
compared to other markets. 
Linked to the subsidy process is the quality measurement system, which is a key 
factor in the greater Copenhagen area. The purpose of the system is to treat all 
operators alike, no matter the performance or the engagement in their contract. 
The system is strict and based on fines and bonuses, as it is necessary for the 
traffic authority to keep strict standards when operating within institutional 
regulations. 
The system is strict due to some operators, in the beginning of the 2000s, failing 
to comply with the engaged contract, and has therefore developed into a system 
that by some operators is identical with mistrust. However, the traffic authority 
describes the system as a fair and demand-based that complies with both well-
performing operators, and operators which do not perform accordingly with their 
contracts. 
Multi-level governance is a relevant part of the quality measurement system, as it 
reflects on great transparency and promotes strong collaboration between traffic 
authority and operators. 
The well-performing operators will naturally receive fewer fines than less well-
performing operators due to the obvious fact that they perform better. The system 
can arguable be operated differently, but it is important for the traffic authority, 
especially when contracts are engaged on continually longer periods of time and 
are focusing more on delivered quality, to keep their focus on their role as an 
authority that often has to take the final decision. 
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Operating a quality measurement system that serves many passengers and 
operators will always be difficult to run and will arguably never be able to satisfy 
all parts, but the model that serves the greater Copenhagen area suits both the 
traffic authority and the operators. 
One of the key functions within the Danish market is the chain of operations, 
where the customer focus varies depending on the part of the chain. The customer 
in focus for the traffic authority are the municipalities and regions, where the 
operators serve the traffic authority, hence a natural product of these customers 
are the passengers. 
The operators often raise the concerns on the traffic issues in order to perform 
well to the passengers, as buses are increasingly delayed due to the rise of traffic 
congestions in the municipality of Copenhagen. If the passenger is not satisfied, 
the operators will have a difficult time satisfying their customer, which is the 
traffic authority, who again will have trouble satisfying their customer 
Therefore, it is essential that the chain of operations functions in order to satisfy 
all customers in the chain. If one fails, it will often lead to a chain-reaction in 
which all will be unable perform accordingly to the engaged contract. 
Institutional regulation and multi-level governance is a large part of the chain of 
operations, where all parts are depending on each other. But through legal 
pluralism, it is understood that all parts of the chain have a different understanding 
of the legal system. 
The customer focus on the Danish market is not only understood by the singular 
customer of each part of the chain, but has to be understood from the perspective 
of each part. Furthermore, the passenger focus is highly important in order for the 
chain to function. The passengers have as well a different understanding of the 
legal system. 
A number of weaknesses can be identified in this research. Interviews with 
regulatory staff were not performed, which could complement the study with 
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relevant knowledge. Additionally, there is a general lack of literature that is able 
to cover all aspects of this matter, with only 3 authors performing research in the 
past. 
On the other hand, the study holds several strengths, as it provides a detailed 
overview of the structures that constitute the land based transportation system in 
Copenhagen, through the use of both relevant literature and authorities’ inside 
reports; it is complemented with quantitative and qualitative primary data from 
both costumer and staff points of view; and it represents a subject that has not 
been explored deeply, providing opportunity to further research. 
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